INTRODUCTION
In her detailed revision of John Muth's contribution to the rational expectations movement, Esther-Mirjam Sent (2002, p. 293) assesses the reasons for the profession's under appreciation of Muth's pioneering work. In Sent's view, Muth's later recognition stood in stark contrast with the reception of his ideas by his contemporaries, to whom Muth was "a person whom nobody seems to know," writing papers on rational expectations "which nobody seems to read". By recovering the context that helped shape the author's ideas, Sent finds that while Muth "noted inconsistencies in economics," he nevertheless "did not follow up on his own suggestions about how to eliminate those inconsistencies" (p. 294).
1 As a result, his contribution faded into the background of the 1970s intellectual boiling pot.
Not too far into the future, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen was invited to spend some time as a visiting scholar in Brazil. During one of his stays, he developed a theory to understand the apparent resistance of the country's inflation to time-honored orthodox policies. Georgescu-Roegen's experience in the tropics led him to question both sides of the contentious intellectual environment in Latin America. His attempt to provide a rigorous and encompassing approach to the inflation-development impasse that bewildered the region led him to mix bits and pieces of different traditions in economics that hardly made for good bedfellows. Novelties and breakthroughs notwithstanding, the reception of his ideas seem to mirror, in Robert Lucas's words, the symbolic "pat on the back" that Muth received as a consolation prize for his unrecognized contribution.
2 Similarly to Muth, Georgescu-Roegen uncovered inconsistencies in the economics of his time, but very few people seem to have read and appreciated his contribution to the understanding of inflation in underdeveloped economies. This is especially striking given the prescience with which his analysis anticipated topics that would give rise to heated debates in Brazil shortly thereafter. His papers on inflation and growth pointed toward a controversy that developed during the early 1970s, concerning the causes of the income inequality generated by the so-called Brazilian "economic miracle" -the "unequalizing spiral", as Taylor and Bacha (1976) would later describe the country's growth model. 1 Sent goes on to question Lucas's and Sargent's retrospective and inadvertent "recruiting" of Muth to their theoretical camp, claiming the latter's views on rationality were much more complex than the one that came to constitute the new classical "revolution" of the late 1970s. She then argues that Muth's goal was not to transform macroeconomics but merely to illustrate the rationality concepts implicit in theories of bounded rationality and how bounded rationality was accommodated in theories of rationality (2002, p. 294) . 2 In an interview to Arjo Klamer, Lucas commented on the poor acknowledgement of Muth's ideas, stating that "it must be quite an experience to write papers that radical and have people just pat you on the head and say 'That's interesting' and nothing happens" (Klamer 1983, p. 38) . 3 Another implication of Georgescu-Roegen's contribution regarded the non-neutrality of a chronic inflation's distributive effects among social groups. This subject would resurface in the late 1970s as a distinguishing feature of the structuralist argument in the revived controversy over stabilization policies and the inertial inflation hypothesis (see Carvalho 2019 for a detailed account on this topic).
In what follows, we will look into the context in which Georgescu-Roegen's ideas about inflation and growth in underdeveloped economies were matured and disseminated, to understand how such a prominent economist, bearing a consistent message based on an up-to-date modelling style, could have been so blithely ignored by the very people that invited his thoughts on the issue. The paper comprises five sections besides this introduction. Section 2 provides a brief historical contextualization of Georgescu-Roegen's intellectual and institutional involvement with Brazil, emphasizing how his traveling experiences played an important role in crucial moments of his career. Section 3 then outlines the controversy on the causes of inflation in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, highlighting
Mário Henrique Simonsen's 1964 contribution on the topic. Section 4 assesses in detail the main tenets of Georgescu-Roegen's approach to Brazilian inflation, while also trying to situate his contribution within the intellectual landscape prevailing at the time. Section 5 finally raises a few questions concerning the reception -or lack thereof -of Georgescu-Roegen's original analysis by local economists, followed by a few concluding remarks.
THE EMIGRANT ECONOMIST TRAVELS TO THE TROPICS
Late in his life, Georgescu-Roegen became very concerned with establishing his own place in the history of economics. He eagerly accepted the several opportunities that appeared for reflecting on his own life and career, and thus produced a sizeable body of autobiographical writings (1988, 1992a, 1992b, 1993) . In these recollections, he embraced the persona of a dissenting economist and misunderstood genius -a former member of the mainstream who had discovered and pointed out some fundamental flaws in standard economic theory, only to be ostracized by the profession for doing so. The lengthiest and most detailed accounts are contained in the two installments of his memoirs commissioned by the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, stretching from his childhood years to the cinematic escape from communist Romania in 1948. 4 The title he chose for the joint pieces is telling: 'An Emigrant from a Developing Country'. Georgescu-Roegen stressed the importance, for his intellectual trajectory, not only of having been born in a poor and backward country, but especially of later returning to that same country after receiving his first training in economics at "Universitas Schumpeteriana" (1992a, p. 130). Even if he described his twelve years in Romania between 1936 Romania between and 1948 Romania between as an "intellectual hibernation" (1993 , this experience later led him to realize that, from the viewpoint of economic analysis, overpopulated agrarian societies such as his own motherland remained "a reality without a theory" (1976, p. xii) .
After returning to the United States, Georgescu-Roegen settled professionally at Vanderbilt University, in Nashville, Tennessee. He and his wife Otilia thus relocated to the US South, a region beset with its own developmental problems. At Vanderbilt, he found a congenial environment for pursuing his interest in the economic institutions of peasant societies, leading to a long-term engagement with the problems of economic development that spawned the 1950s and 1960s (Suprinyak 2018) . From 1954, the university ran a program designed to offer training on economic development to students sifted from the ranks of public administration in underdeveloped regions. Sponsored by ICA and the Ford Foundation, the Graduate Program in Economic Development (GPED) channeled research funds and overseas fellowships to Vanderbilt faculty in economics and related fields. Georgescu-Roegen benefited recurrently from such resources. As the highest profile member of the economics department, he was sent on a mission to South East Asia, in 1962, on behalf of the GPED, to prospect students and establish contact with US aid missions working in the area. The tour was extended in 1963 to cover India and the Middle East. Himself a native from a developing country, Georgescu-Roegen thus set off on a tour that exposed him to other, more dreadful forms of underdevelopment.
The relevance of travelling as a source of inspiration for economists has been recently the subject of an insightful essay by Mauro Boianovsky (2018) . Even though prominent scholars such as George Stigler (1967) and Herbert Simon (1996) have explicitly downplayed the importance of travelling in providing inputs for the development of economic knowledge, Boianovsky has shown how the travels of economists have systematically given rise, throughout history, to new ideas and insights. "Despite their protective attitude to established theory," he argues, "economists have travelled widely and gained new insights or asked new questions as a result of their exposition to different economic systems and behavior" (2018, p. 153) . When they travel, economists learn about the other but also about themselves, as different realities offer a mirror in which they can see their own premises and values more clearly. To Boianovsky, moreover, the potential effects of travelling are magnified when it takes place at critical junctures within the intellectual trajectory of economists, either during their formative years, or else when their ideas are undergoing fundamental changes. In these circumstances, travel experiences can and often do become an integral part of their analytical worldview, thus reinforcing their relevance as a subject for the history of economics.
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen was a travelling economist in a double sense. An immigrant at home, he later became professionally engaged in a series of expeditions that brought him in contact with realities drastically different from his own. What is more, most of his travelling took place at decisive turning points in his career. We have already seen how he himself recognized the importance of moving back and forth between the Western developed world and his native Romania during his formative years as an economist -an experience eliciting questions and insights that would thenceforth accompany him.
5
Even though he never discussed his later travels at any length, these also took place when GeorgescuRoegen found himself at another crossroads. During the early 1960s, he began to develop the set of concepts and ideas that would later mature into his celebrated bioeconomic approach. The set of lecture courses entitled 'Process, Value, and Development', which he delivered in Japan in 1962-63, contained drafts of arguments that first appeared in print in the long introductory essay to Analytical Economics (1966) Myths (1976) , under the section heading 'Institutional Economics'. In the preface, Georgescu-Roegen described the analytical approach adopted in the paper as a "physiological analysis of inflation," in line with the "fundamental change in my orientation as an economist" (pp. ix, xx). In Brazilian inflation, he believed to have found yet another economic phenomenon that defied the concepts and tools of standard economic analysis.
Differently from the peasant economy of Romania, however, Brazilian inflation was a reality that already had its own theory. The topic had provided a focal point for the burgeoning community of Brazilian economists since at least the 1950s. When the first version of his paper was published in 1968, Georgescu-Roegen thus entered a field already crowded with very entrenched positions. By investigating the place he occupied amidst the ongoing arguments, we will find clues to understand both the relevance and the ultimate fate of his contribution.
THE INFLATION CONTROVERSY IN LATIN AMERICA
The postwar inflation problem has received a great deal of attention from both economists and historians of economics in various countries across Western capitalist society, both developed and underdeveloped. In the developed world, Solow and Samuelson (1960) established a common lexicon on the matter by way of an analytical Phillips curve that put to rest the dispute between cost-push and demand-pull causes of inflation, steering attention toward the curve's slope and its equilibrium rate in the inflation-unemployment nexus (Forder 2010) . Among underdeveloped economies, Latin America had become prominent for its seemingly high tolerance to an above-normal, persistent inflationary record. The apparent immunity of inflation in the region to conventional monetary measures attracted great interest from the international community of economists and other social scientists. Felix (1961) , Baer and Kerstenetzky (1964) and Baer (1967) provide encompassing heat-of-the-moment accounts of the controversy over the causes of inflation in Latin America, the policies designed to curb it and its effects upon economic development. Later takes on the feud can be found in Lopes (1979) , Toye (1987) , Taylor (2004) , Boianovsky (2012) , Bianchi (2018) and Carvalho (2019) .
Despite variations in emphasis, the general story involves an opposition between monetarists tied to updated versions of the quantity theory of money, on one hand, and structuralist economists associated with the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), on the other. Monetarists claimed government profligacy coupled with monetary laxity were responsible for infusing momentum into price rises. Inflation was a monetary phenomenon and, as such, restrictive policy measures would do away with both its causes and harmful effects, such as: inducing investment in overcapitalized sectors while leaving others undercapitalized; the erosion of purchasing power that fed back into workers' demands for higher wages; distortions on profit accounting that led to excessive taxation of firm revenues; and disincentives to savings that hurt several sectors, especially construction and real estate. Sectoral shortages of supply were understood as inflation-induced bottlenecks. Curbing inflation, in the monetarist view, required stabilization crises to correct imbalances and eliminate price distortions that affected the behavior and expectations of agents, thereby opening new paths of development and prosperity (Campos 1961; Simonsen 1964 Simonsen , 1970 .
Structuralists, on the other hand, claimed that inflation was caused by a host of non-monetary forces that fed into monetary channels, rendering the quantity of money "passive" to those primary sources of price rises. The non-monetary aspects were inflation-feeding bottlenecks. They were linked to dual productive structures that resulted from an abundance of natural resources and labor combined with scarcity of capital and technical progress. The existence of backward sectors led to export profiles largely dependent on a few primary goods, making the balance of payments vulnerable to international price swings and thus feeding the disequilibria into the price system via exchange rate depreciations.
Moreover, the rigid productive structure did not match existing patterns of demand. A high propensity to spend by the elites channeled a highly concentrated income distribution to the modern sectors focused on producing luxury consumption goods. This came to the detriment of wage-good producing sectors, particularly foodstuffs, whose limited and rigid supply depended heavily on imports, hence on the exchange rate. Institutions designed on top of this widely unstable and inequitable economic apparatus usually led to a rigid and regressive tax structure and a lack of discipline on the side of government spending. These built-in fiscal imbalances translated into monetary laxity, either by expanding the monetary base or by fueling bank credit (Kalecki 1954; Furtado 1954 Furtado , 1963 Furtado [1959 ; Noyola Vásquez 1956; Olivera 1964) .
A deformed socioeconomic structure was bound to produce dysfunctional institutions and lead to poor economic outcomes, such as persistent inflation and rising inequality. Deploying monetary instruments to contain inflation therefore meant tackling the symptoms while potentially aggravating the causes. Against monetary dogmatism, structuralists contended that a mild inflation could prove useful in correcting the very disequilibria that gave rise to it. By way of forced savings, rising prices could provide the funds to industrial entrepreneurs and/or the State to actively deploy planning strategies in pursuit of a more flexible, productive and autonomous economic structure. If properly dealt with, inflation could provide the seeds of its own destruction. The eradication of inflation should be the end result of a successful development policy (Felix 1961) .
Whatever caused inflation in Latin America, it was consensual that the phenomenon had become so widespread and persistent that social and economic institutions were forced to adapt to it, mainly by way of some sort of sliding-scale or indexation. This conferred a certain mechanical behavior to prices hitched, formally or informally, to inflation indexes (Heymann and Leijonhufvud 1995, p. 34) . As a result, Latin American economists developed their own original brand of visual representation. The sawtooth wages model -or "zig-zag pattern of real wages" -depicted a cyclically recurrent behavior with a dented shape, which portrayed how real wages were eroded by inflation in between adjustments that restored them to their peak value. Vera (2013) identified the first appearance of this diagram in Nicholas Kaldor's (1957) contribution to the local structuralist approach, as part of a series of lectures he gave in 1956 at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, in Rio de Janeiro. Kaldor's rather intuitive and discursive model was followed by the more refined visual-analytical description of the sawtooth pattern of inflation developed by Mário Henrique Simonsen (1964, p. 92) , which eventually became the workhorse for Brazilian debates on stabilization policy during the early 1980s.
12 A better understanding of Georgescu-Roegen's contribution on the subject requires delving in some detail into Simonsen's use of the model and the conclusions and policy statements he derived from it. Simonsen (1964) presented an eclectic account of the causes of inflation in Brazil, with an entire chapter devoted to the "socio-political causes of [chronic] inflation". In the context of a rapid State-led industrializing process, the government sought to accommodate conflicts over output shares by printing money. A "revolution [of] increasing aspirations" would then contaminate the psychological attitude of economic agents in underdeveloped economies. In this setting, wages tended to outpace productivity 12 See Carvalho (2015) for a history of this visual depiction of inflation dynamics. growth, as a low-income population that abruptly widened its "consumption horizons" demanded improvement in its living standards. 13 Simonsen was critical of the government's weakness in reaching "distributively compatible decisions", thereby fueling the "popular insensitivity to the causes of inflation" and reinforcing a "philosophy of distributional incompatibility" by way of "ignorance or strategy" (p. 16). The result, Simonsen added, was that real incomes underwent an oscillatory behavior that was virtually consistent at the aggregate level, since when some groups obtained their peak real income, others were either midway or at their "trough", given the unsynchronized structure of income adjustments. This gave rise to the "sawtooth" shape, as reproduced in FIGURE 1 below.
FIGURE 1 Saw-tooth shape of the real minimum wage in the State of Guanabara between 1952 and 1964 (left panel)
and scheme of real wage behavior through time (right panel)* Source: Simonsen (1964, pp. 18 and 92, respectively) . (*) Title of the diagram reads "Schematic Representation of the Wage Adjustment Formula". Below, in brackets, one reads "Average plus increase in productivity". The image represents the peak real wage ("Picos") at level A, the average real wage ("Média") at level E and the trough real wage ("Vales") at level C.
Two aspects of the narrative above will help us better appreciate Georgescu-Roegen's analysis of inflation and growth in underdeveloped economies. First, Simonsen's empirical depiction of the zigzag pattern of wages relied solely on minimum wage data (left diagram), which was hardly representative of the broader wage profile of the economy. By under stressing the role of non-labor incomes (taken as residual claimants), the importance of conflict among social classes is largely reduced and, consequently, little attention is given to the distributional effects of stabilization. Secondly, the diagram to the right displays a constant peak real wage, which is periodically achieved according to the 13 In this early work, the analysis is embedded in the conflict-theory terminology of the time. In what concerns the aspiration gap, later formulated by Rowthorn (1977) (Simonsen, 1964, p. 15) . readjustment schedule. Simonsen thus operated the model to show a feedback process that would favor stabilization policy. Should inflation be controlled, real wages would not erode as fast (a flatter downward-sloping line on the far-right part of the diagram below) and a lengthier period between readjustments would not only render easier any further attempts to keep prices well-behaved, but would also allow wages to benefit from increased productivity (upward shift of the horizontal dotted line representing real average wage). In sum, a milder inflation would lead to a lower peak real wage that would trigger a less defensive stance by entrepreneurs, which in its turn would boost the productivity of labor by furthering investments.
A few years after Simonsen's first analytical attempt at rationalizing the zig-zag pattern of real wages, Georgescu-Roegen (1968; published his two papers on the "structural inflation-lock", both appearing in Portuguese in the pages of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation's Revista Brasileira de Economia. Simonsen accumulated many scholarly and administrative responsibilities in the Vargas Foundation, including the editorship of the journal itself. Apart from Moraes (1990, pp. 14-17) , the literature has thus far overlooked this interesting chapter in the history of the inflation-stabilization controversy in Latin America. In what follows, we will show how Georgescu-Roegen's take on the inflation-development impasse revealed the existence of a distributive blind spot in Simonsen's operation of the sawtooth wages model.
THE STRUCTURAL INFLATION-LOCK AND THE DEVELOPMENT ISSUE
When contextualizing his "physiological analysis of inflation applied to Latin American countries" for its republication as part of the volume Energy and Economic Myths, Georgescu-Roegen defined Brazil as "a part of the world where money forging by the government seems to be an endemic disease" (1976, p. xx) . This opinion concurred with Simonsen's (1964) view of inflation as a result of weak governmental discipline over conflicting distributive claims. However, in contrast with Simonsen's "constant average real wage" conclusion, Georgescu-Roegen claimed that inflation was a fairly efficient means of redistributing income and wealth, though hardly a neutral one. Even when leaving aside the fixed/adjustable income divide, he contended, for instance, that "even in a country in which all employees would be entitled to instantaneous escalation of their remuneration, they would still be losers," since "their pensions and life insurance policies will nevertheless depreciate, and (if taxation is progressive) their real taxes will automatically increase".
Inflation was so stubborn in Latin America that it had risen to the status of an economic regime, to such an extent that even the most sophisticated "monetary wizardry alone cannot cure an inflation state" (1976 [1970] , p. 186). Among other things, inflation had come to be regarded as a "passable system of taxation" (p. 163). Understanding why required delving into the structure of these dual economies, and into their institutional network of regulations, policies and contractual arrangements. As with every "lock-in" type of phenomena, "sequential decisions 'groove' out an advantage which the system finds it hard to escape from" (Arthur 1988, p. 13) . In Georgescu-Roegen's view, the inflation state stemmed from the political convenience of not tackling the set of systemic advantages in favor of the upper classes (particularly subsidies and price controls). Although these advantages made the economic system operational, the structural imbalances and the regressive transfer of income they entailed led to what Setterfield (1993, p. 771, n. 14) called an "inefficient institutional lock-in" that hindered the economy's development.
Georgescu-Roegen went to some length to differentiate what J. M. Keynes (1923) called creditinflation from the type of cash-inflation that monetarists usually ascribed to profligate governments monetizing fiscal deficits. Credit-inflation of a "moderate intensity" was commonly seen in "advanced economies with a well-organized money market and a monetary circuit encompassing all economic units, with only a standard guidance of the interest rate by the central banking authority, but without any direct government controls over prices, wages, and rents" (1976 [1970] , p. 150). Cash-inflation, on the other hand, described a process set off by an increase in the quantity of money in circulation -in other words, it amounted to the standard theory at the time. Georgescu-Roegen took issue with the "uncritical extrapolation of standard theory" of the cash-inflation type to any situation, which sometimes made "facts appear unsettled", thus inviting controversies such as the one raging in Latin America. To remedy this methodological inadequacy, he proposed to undertake "a systematic analysis of the problem not in terms of curves or systems of equations," but instead "in terms of 'structures' in the tradition of the French school of François Perroux" (pp. 152).
Georgescu-Roegen carefully dismissed as unconvincing the orthodox reading of inflationbased on Friedman (1963 Friedman ( , 1968 ) -on account of its assumption that the system could restore equilibrium after price changes while also keeping its structure intact. He then tackled the complex diffusion process of any cash-inflation that carries income and wealth from one hand to the other throughout the economic system. The ensuing profile of income distribution implied a "structural redistribution of demand [that] will in turn cause a commensurate structural redistribution of resources" (p. 158). As a result, "a new economic structure with a new constellation of relative prices" was likely to emerge. This heterogeneous and asymmetric distribution of income under a cash-inflation had several determinants. The "political factor" introduced a biased distribution of "fresh money" into the economy, while the "mechanical factor" accounted for the differential lags in the ensuing diffusion process. Additionally, there were also the various instances of "money illusion" -or "money fetishism" -and the "nature of contracts regulating the income" of each economic unit. Finally, there remained the political factor associated with "the special government regulations usually associated with a prolonged use of cash-inflation," meaning the set of price controls (wages, loans, rents, etc.) that benefited the upper classes, and the dual economic structure that fulfilled their consumption aspirations.
The key feature here was a non-neutral framework connecting inflation and income distribution, where different classes of income were associated with specific reactions to money illusion and contractual arrangements. Persistent inflation was bound to turn the economic process into a rigged "speculative game," in which "some participate with free initial stakes," the "rules vary with the economic status" of each individual and, finally, "the ability to play it also varies with this status" (p. 163). Upper income classes were populated by entrepreneurs and bankers who earn non-contractual incomes and hence "have the freedom of adapting themselves almost instantaneously to the inflationary current". Moreover, their better education and "broader economic experience" provided them with "a keen sense of business". Since "they ordinarily are the main saving element of the society," GeorgescuRoegen affirmed, "they shake off their money fetishism without any delay" (p. 162). Rentiers and landowners, also a part of the upper classes, faced a more challenging scenario. They shared with workers and pensioners the constraints imposed by contractual incomes, meaning that the nominal value of their compensation remained fixed throughout the duration of their contracts. By summoning their economic and political power, these upper income groups could affect the institutional arrangements determining the length of contracts and periodic adjustment clauses. Georgescu-Roegen then showed how wages and salaries usually took the hardest hit, for "the duration of the contract is determined (and only vaguely so) by the prevailing institutional relations between employers and employees, not by the contract itself" (p. 161). Should the economy face abundant labor, the bargaining power of workers tended to be even feebler, so that "the greater burden of the cost involved will ultimately fall on their shoulders" (p. 162).
The structural inflation-lock provided an alternative model of inflation for underdeveloped economies that had superimposed an industrial setting onto otherwise "feudal" patterns of income and wealth distribution. As a result, manufacturing could only find profitable opportunities in segments catering to the luxury demands of the upper-income classes, to the detriment of wage-goods industries and agriculture. Investment in the luxury goods sector thus spilled over to the whole economy, albeit with low income and employment multipliers and negligible spillover effects on investments in other sectors. Moreover, the labor-capital ratio in the luxury goods sectors fell far short of the necessary to employ a large population. Given an abundant labor supply, development ended up trapping most of the generated income into the top echelons of society. Trickle-down economics then became the rule.
Development was conditioned upon dynamism in luxury goods industries, which could only be achieved by continually putting cheap credit -mostly through interest rate caps -into the hands of entrepreneurs, while the banking system rationed loans to lower income classes. Wage controls kept labor's share of the national output either constant or decreasing, and the ensuing depressed aggregate demand limited the profitability of wage-goods industries while prohibiting workers from acquiring luxury goods (automobiles, refrigerators and other durables).
In this setting, any restrictive monetary measures aimed at controlling prices would squeeze the profits amassed by the top income strata, and thus impose even harsher consequences on the bottom strata via unemployment. The government was then prone to take the path of least resistance, namely, cash-inflation. It was in this sense that an inflation state amounted to a functional, albeit inefficient, policy choice. Inflation became a chronic condition that made for a politically feasible taxation system, transferring income and wealth from lower-to upper-income classes and thus reinforcing productive backwardness and socioeconomic inequality. Georgescu-Roegen blithely denounced the orthodox claim that inflation arose from the aspirations of the masses to raise their standards of living (Campos 1961, p. 82) . Quite the contrary, he argued, "cash-inflation has been used in Latin America to thwart the socioeconomic reforms adopted by a semi-feudal society for display or demagogic purposes" (p. 164). It was, in other words, the system's response to "the aspirations of the upper classes for a more luxurious life" (p. 181).
Expanding on Simonsen's sawtooth diagram, Georgescu-Roegen (1968, p. 12-14) demonstrated that this specific economic and institutional structure was largely biased toward the upper classes. He drew a "see-saw" diagram with semi-log scales to depict the impact of inflation on fixed-income earners. At the date of every wage adjustment, recipients of fixed incomes restored their peak level of real income. Given the constant inflationary corrosion of real incomes, the "normal" level coincided with the average real income throughout the period (denoted by "R" in the top diagram in Figure 2 below).
Inflation would thus be neutral in the dynamic sense of income distribution, as anticipated by Furtado (1954) and Pazos (1963) . The pitfall in Simonsen's conclusion (diagram "a" below) lay in his disregard for labor productivity enhancements, which were bound to occur along the development process. These were depicted by the upward-sloping I-I line on diagram "b". Note that the W-W line is slightly positively inclined to account for population growth. The difference between the slopes of I-I and W-W thus accounted for the income transfer from fixed-income recipients (mostly workers) to variableincome earners.
FIGURE 2
The saw-tooth diagrams and regressive income distribution Source: Georgescu-Roegen (1968, p. 13) Consider an expansion of the luxury goods sector. A new round of investments in that sector requires demand to grow in real terms. The source of this new demand arises from an injection of cheap credit into that system that feeds into profits, making them "increase in real terms at the expense of contractual incomes". If wages are then readjusted at a lower real level, profits are bound to keep growing. Alternatively, if real wages are frequently restored to their previous peak level, then "there is no additional transfer of income to account for the continous [sic] increase in demand". Therefore, an inflation-induced development is the "answer to this new puzzle," namely, cash-inflation boosts demand, which "keeps increasing because there is development" and thus "the corresponding increase in real income is funneled into the incomes of the upper classes through the device of cheap bank loans" (1976 [1970] , p. 176). It is worth quoting Georgescu-Roegen's conclusion at length:
[…] the inflation state, with one hand, increases the demand for some commodities and, with the other, supplies easy money for the expansion of the corresponding industries. Abstracting from the usual frictions, we have an ideal push-pull mechanism that reminds us of Say's law. , p. 176).
In a diagram positing a distribution-related visual argument (Figure 3 below) , GeorgescuRoegen showed that a policy restoring real incomes to their previous levels without correcting for productivity gains (diagram "a") led to concentration of wealth as variable-income earners absorb the entire productivity gains (measured by the triangle FBF' in diagram "b"). The D-D' line expresses the average real wage in a growing economy, while F-F' depicts the peak real wage level. The result was measured in welfare terms: lower-income classes fell out of favor while property-owning classes enjoyed an increase in luxury consumption. Paraphrasing Marx, he claimed that the inflation state was "the craftiest device by which all gain from increased productivity is turned into surplus value". He thus sought to "decry the 'positive' evils of cash-inflation," manifest in "the excessive investment in the luxury goods industries" to the detriment "of those lines which require a longer 'waiting' -the capital goods industries and the public utilities" (p. 180).
FIGURE 3
The saw-tooth diagrams and income distribution in a growing economy Source: Georgescu-Roegen (1968, p. 13 ).
The only solution to this structural inflation-lock involved "correcting the unbalanced structure of such an economy and setting it on the track of balanced development". This could be achieved by curbing the growth of the luxury goods industries and developing the other sectors, "in particular the wage goods industry in the hierarchical order of these goods". If "lasting economic development" could occur "only if more and more luxury goods become wage goods," channeling the growth of income toward the laboring classes infused endogenous dynamism into the economic structure. The relatively higher labor-output ratio of the wage goods industry "creates its own demand and by offering a larger number of opportunities to the would-be entrepreneurs it also supports the demand for the luxury goods". A gradual rationing of cheap credit to the luxury goods sectors, coupled with a necessary increase in real wages, could shift demand toward the new wages goods sector without resulting in a lock. Economic policy simply needed to do keep the growth of real wages tied to productivity gains, to avoid the emergence of inflationary pressures (p. 185).
How can we make sense of Georgescu-Roegen's contribution to the intellectual boiling pot of inflation debates in Latin America? Despite his differences with the Latin American structuralists, discussed in more detail below, his argument does echo Kalecki's (1954) two-sector model and Kaldor's (1959, p. 200-209) analysis of the Chilean inflation as an income-distributing process favoring propertyowning and capitalist classes with a high propensity to consume luxury goods. His concern with fiscal imbalances is reminiscent of discussions by Noyola Vásquez (1956) and Furtado (1963 Furtado ( [1959 ) about the rigid tax structures that rendered budget deficits practically inevitable. Regarding structural change, his emphasis on the incapacity of underdeveloped countries to generate growth and employment in a sustained manner resonates with Furtado's (1954) argument about the perverse effects of importing technology from economies with very different relative factor endowments. On the other hand, Georgescu-Roegen's interpretation of how structural imbalances fed into inflationary pressures also falls comfortably within the monetarist camp. For instance, when he stated that "the growth induced by an inflation state of the kind that has prevailed in Latin America is highly unbalanced," he intimated that the economic structures of countries that launched industrialization programs "may even be as unbalanced as they were before the process of industrialization began" (1976 [1970] , p. 181). This was an explicit argument in favor of Campos' (1961) inflation-inducing bottlenecks. Moreover, his stated solution to the structural inflation-lock -channeling resources to boost the wages-good sector -was qualified by his strong distrust of the State's ability to effectively pursue such an agenda, since "the proclivities and class interests" tended to "preside also over public investment which, more often than not, creates new 'utilities' mainly for the upper classes" (p. 181, fn. 1).
Finally, as far is his communication strategy is concerned, Georgescu-Roegen never offered an explicit mathematical statement of the saw-tooth diagram, even though he clearly used it, just like Simonsen, as a formal tool to reason about a chronically inflationary environment. His analysis expanded on Simonsen's original model and unearthed a host of complex forces that seemed to trap underdeveloped economies in a structural inflation-lock. Curiously, Simonsen never responded to Georgescu-Roegen's papers; nor did much anyone else for that matter. The next section delves into some of the possible reasons for the poor resonance of Georgescu-Roegen's ideas on inflation and economic development in Latin America.
PRESCIENCE AND ECLECTICISM (OR HOW NOT TO MAKE AN IMPACT)
When the first version of his paper was published in Portuguese in 1968, Georgescu-Roegen was very conversant with the Brazilian community of economists. He had visited the country in 1964 and 1966, later returning, once again, in 1973. Even while in Nashville, however, he remained in contact with Brazilian economics through several channels: his Vanderbilt colleagues who were sent down to lecture in the country, the Brazilian students who came to Vanderbilt to pursue their graduate studies, and his frequent correspondence with some of the most prominent Brazilian economists of the time. Given all this, it is rather surprising to realize how timid was the reaction to his ideas on inflation and growth in underdeveloped countries, especially considering the topical character of the subject matter. The paper was acknowledged by a handful of other scholars who shared an interest in Brazilian inflation, but it never came close to becoming a standard reference in the field. This becomes even more surprising when we consider the emphasis given by Georgescu-Roegen to the adverse effects on income distribution brought about by inflation -a topic that was at the center of a heated debate in Brazil throughout the 1970s. How can we then account for this relative neglect, under otherwise such favorable conditions?
Even before the paper was published for the first time, Georgescu-Roegen's take on the dynamics connecting inflation and growth was already interpreted and subsumed within the terms of the debate between monetarists and structuralists still raging in Latin America. In an influential survey published in 1967, his Vanderbilt colleague Werner Baer argued that Georgescu-Roegen's contribution, then circulating in mimeographed format, could be "considered to fall more within the structuralist tradition" (Baer 1967, p. 20) . This assessment was based on how Georgescu-Roegen emphasized the discrepancies between the built-up industrial capacity in Latin American countries, strongly biased toward luxury goods, and the new "structure of demand" generated by income distribution policies. Baer also highlighted Georgescu-Roegen's suggestion that the structural inflation-lock affecting Latin American economies could not be solved by "purely monetary wizardry," requiring instead a "prolonged and well-planned action upon the real -as opposed to the monetary -elements of the problem". Baer's portrayal of his colleague as a contributor to the structuralist camp seems to have taken root, being repeated in other occasions throughout the 1970s. In their introduction to the special issue of Revista Brasileira de Economia where the extended version of the paper was republished in 1972, Denio Nogueira and Carlos Manoel Peláez argued that Georgescu-Roegen was responsible for "enriching structuralist models" by introducing the premise that industrialization in Latin America had been led by the production of luxury, instead of wage goods (Nogueira & Peláez 1972, p. 55) . Mansfield and Wogart (1975, p. 336 ) also enlisted Georgescu-Roegen as part of the Latin American structuralist approach, alongside Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado. In a similar vein, Silva, Luque and Cruz (1977, p. 578) highlighted "Georgescu-Roegen's important contribution to Latin American structuralism".
There was something inherently plausible about this characterization. The central argument developed in the paper indeed relied on the existence of structural imbalances between industrial capacity and sectoral demand in underdeveloped countries, and the historical-institutional constraints sustaining these lopsided structures. Moreover, as mentioned above, Georgescu-Roegen stated explicitly in the extended version that he wished to analyze the problem "in terms of 'structures' in the tradition of the French school of François Perroux" (1976 [1970], p. 152) .
14 This found expression in the idea of an "inflation state" arising out of the unbalanced productive structure, where different economic groups struggled to preserve or increase their distributive shares, with varying degrees of success. The influence of French structuralism on Latin American economists associated with ECLAC is well-documented in the literature, and Furtado himself explicitly recognized his intellectual indebtedness to François Perroux, with whom he studied during his doctorate at the Sorbonne in the late 1940s. 15 All of this circumstantial evidence certainly contributed to legitimize the reading of Georgescu-Roegen's paper as a contribution to the structuralist cause. Accordingly, authors such as Baer (1969, p. 276) and Bacha (1973, p. 937 ) explicitly compared its approach to the ideas of Furtado on industrialization and growth in Latin America.
Georgescu-Roegen himself, however, must have felt very uncomfortable being put in such company. As he clarified in the Foreword to Energy and Economic Myths, the motivation behind the paper lay in his conviction that, "in all periods of history, inflation has been a legal, albeit abusive, money forging," going "immediately into the pockets of some groups, which vary with the political interests of each government" (1976, p. xx) . His deep-seated aversion toward inflationary policy instruments was later reinforced in one of his autobiographical writings: [...] rubbing myself against the disturbing facts of the monetary conditions of Brazil, I reached another heretical conclusion to which I still cling firmly. Contrary to the general tenet of the professinal establishment that inflation is the best strategy for economic development, inflation is the most perverse way of governing. Another invisible hand, a Keynesian this time, picks the pockets of the masses who cannot borrow at a privileged interest rate now and pay later (Georgescu-Roegen 1992a, p. 134) In the writings and policy recommendations of economists from the structuralist camp, Georgescu-Roegen identified a tendency to see inflation as the necessary price to be paid for economic development in Latin America -a position with which he strongly disagreed. His attempts to distance himself from this approach become clear when we compare the two versions of the paper, published in 1968 and 1970. Whereas the earlier version presents the argument as an extension of GeorgescuRoegen's insights into the irreversibility of investment decisions, the later version is prefaced by a laborious inquiry into the nature of inflation and the different interpretations of the phenomenon offered by economic theory. Right from the start, he establishes that "the position shared by many students of Latin American economies that a cash-inflation held within 'reasonable' limits is the inevitable solution for the economic development of these countries is far from being clear" (1976 [1970] , p. 152). A whole section of the extended paper is then dedicated to discussing whether inflation is "an acceptable method of taxation", concluding largely in the negative.
One of the foremost advocates of inflation as a useful instrument in the process of economic development was Werner Baer himself, the first to portray Georgescu-Roegen as a structuralist fellowtraveler. Baer was one of the leading specialists in the Brazilian economy working in the US at the time. Through his joint work as a Vanderbilt professor and a program advisor to the Ford Foundation, he had managed to establish himself as a greatly influential figure within the Brazilian community of economists. Not mentioned in the 1968 paper, Baer was listed in the later extended version as one of the supporters of the thesis that "cash-inflation is the only expedient policy for accelerating the growth of an underdeveloped economy" (1976 [1970] , p. 173). Georgescu-Roegen described as "downright frustrating" his argument that inflation could be an effective means of taxation in underdeveloped economies without an adequate fiscal-administrative apparatus (p. 164). He also criticized the notion of "illusory profits" presented in a joint paper by Baer and Simonsen (1965) , a significant shift in his tone toward the latter. If the earlier version built explicitly on Simonsen's "admirable analysis of the Brazilian inflationary experience" (1968, p. 12), such praise is nowhere to be found in the 1970 paper. Even though Simonsen was not, strictly speaking, within the structuralist tradition, Georgescu-Roegen came to believe that his concrete policy agenda pointed toward the same wrong-headed conclusions. In a 1973 letter to Milton Friedman, for instance, he described Simonsen as a "fierce supporter of the inflationary practice". 16 16 Letter from Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen to Milton Friedman, December 4, 1973; NG-RP, Box 22, Folder 'Friedman, Milton 1973 '. In the same letter, Georgescu-Roegen referred to Simonsen's "stubborn arrogance", a further indication of the growing estrangement between them. Years later, in correspondence with another Brazilian economist, he remarked that Simonsen, "being educated first as an engineer, cannot easily conceive that economics is not just some chapter of engineering" [Letter from Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen to Antonio Maria da Silveira, August 17, 1982; NG-RP, Box 26, Folder 'da Silveira, Antonio 1981 -1990 .
Georgescu-Roegen struggled even further to dissociate his image from ECLAC structuralism during his 1973 visit to Brazil. In a press conference, he criticized Raul Prebisch's core-periphery framework, insisting instead that economic development in Latin America was hampered by essentially domestic factors. 17 The solution he envisaged, in line with the thesis presented in his earlier paper, relied on stimulating industrial growth in the wage-goods sector. Given the terms of the Brazilian debate on inflation, however, Georgescu-Roegen would be hard pressed to find sympathetic ears on the other side of the fence. After all, he took as a point of departure for his analysis that the "endless controversy" over inflation in Latin America had been caused by the "uncritical extrapolation of the standard theory" (1976 [1970] , p. 151). Inflation, he argued, was a "diffusion process" that could be "described in its broad lines but not cast into a mathematical model" (p. 157). The factors determining this diffusion were mostly institutional and cultural in their nature, and so differed widely between developed and underdeveloped societies. Building on an insight from his previous studies on peasant economies, for example, he maintained that poor people regarded cash as a summum bonum, which exposed them more severely to the adverse distributive effects of inflation. By the late 1960s, in sum, Georgescu-Roegen had already moved too far from "standard theory" to condone attempts to explain Brazilian inflation by resorting to the Chicago version of the quantity theory of money.
Accordingly, he was given the cold shoulder by scholars who took a more orthodox stance toward Brazilian inflation. In landmark contributions from the period such as Pastore (1969 Pastore ( , 1973 , Lemgruber (1973 Lemgruber ( , 1974 and Contador (1973 Contador ( , 1974 , we find no mention of Georgescu-Roegen's analysis at all. Even Simonsen, who had commissioned the first version of the paper, never seems to have acknowledged its merits. One reason might reside in the breadth of Georgescu-Roegen's theoretical eclecticism in his musings over Brazilian inflation. He attempted to conciliate, within the same analytical framework, a "structural proneness" to inflation-feeding fiscal imbalances -in line with Campos (1962) , Olivera (1964) and Simonsen (1964) -caused by structural rigidities and distributive conflicts embedded in path dependencies -which echoed the claims of ECLAC and the French structuralist school. These features were then crammed into a dual economy model à la Lewis (1954) , which also informed Post-Keynesian approaches such as Kalecki (1954) and Kaldor (1958) . In short, GeorgescuRoegen seemed to have no qualms about deploying a veritable methodological mélange to delve beneath the veil of aggregates and thus extricate the largely regressive distributive dynamics entailed by a state of inflation. This maverick intellectual attitude, however, may have offended Simonsen's self-imposed decorum of methodological purity and simplicity. Georgescu-Roegen's economics was too heterodox for the monetarists, while the policy implications of his analysis remained too orthodox for structuralists to stand by them. Straddled between these two camps, his ideas fell on barren ground. He was patted on the back by some, ignored by others, and taken seriously by very few. August 29, 1973, p. 30. 18 An exception was the Brazilian economist Francisco Lopes, who developed a model of development and stagnation trying to build on some of Georgescu-Roegen's insights (Lopes 1969) .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Throughout the 1970s, a heated discussion about the effects of economic growth on income distribution developed in Brazil, having the Chicago-trained Brazilian economist Carlos Langoni and Berkeley Professor Albert Fishlow as its main protagonists. 19 Given its emphasis on the bias toward luxury goods inherent in Brazilian industrial capacity, and the structural pressure this introduced in favor of preserving the real income of the upper classes, Georgescu-Roegen's analysis of Brazilian inflation and growth had something relevant to offer on this topic. Writing in the early 1970s, William Tyler resorted to Georgescu-Roegen's paper to support his contention that "the inability of wage-earners to defend their real incomes" meant that inflation resulted in "a tendency to make the income distribution more uneven" (1973, p. 322) . In personal correspondence around the same time, Brazilian economist Santiago Fernandes asked Georgescu-Roegen whether he was "familiar with Albert Fishlow's criticism of Brazilian unequal income distribution," suggesting that Langoni and him "both could profit from your article in the RBE". 20 Years later, another Brazilian economist also referred to his paper as "an excellent work examining the redistributive effects of inflation and exposing strong arguments against its use as a mechanism for financing industrialization" (Moraes 1982, p. 672) . And yet, the entire debate on economic development and income distribution developed during the 1970s with scarcely any mention to Georgescu-Roegen's ideas.
In the end, Georgescu-Roegen's travels proved to be a double-edged sword. On one hand, his discovery of the Brazilian inflationary problem dovetailed quite well with his larger intellectual concerns at the time, thus reinforcing the "fundamental change" that led him to identify himself, more and more, as a dissenting voice to the mainstream. He remained, however, too much of an outsider to the Brazilian economics community for his contribution to have the strong and lasting impact he thought it deserved. Contrary to some of his Vanderbilt colleagues, like Werner Baer, who turned Brazil into their second homes, Georgescu-Roegen's visits were too occasional to lead to any sustained engagement with the intricacies of the local debate. 21 Unable to navigate the different factions in which Brazilian economists grouped themselves, he never managed to get his contribution embraced by those who set the terms of the discussion. Instead of giving rise to a new analytical framework, Georgescu-Roegen's papers on inflation and economic development in Latin America thus added to the long list of frustrations he accumulated throughout his career (Iglesias 2009 ). If time would prove his prescience when pointing to the perverse effects on income distribution resulting from the inflationary practices of Latin American governments, his vision got buried between those who disliked his heterodox theories and those who, in his view, tried to use them to legitimize their misguided policies.
